> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.qwertycoin.org/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.qwertycoin.org/epose/configuration-and-identity.md).

# Configuration and Identity

> **Verified against:** the latest stable Core release; exact review revisions are recorded in the [Source and version matrix](/contribution-and-evidence/source-version-matrix.md).

| Object              | Role                                                               | Sensitivity/persistence                         |
| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------- |
| Operator identity   | Stable service identity and lifecycle authority                    | Private; back up; preserve across upgrades      |
| Online service key  | Signs endpoint/service responses; may rotate under lifecycle rules | Private; managed in the keystore                |
| Endpoint descriptor | Signed public host/port and commitments                            | Public; sequence/activation are consensus-bound |
| Reward address      | Primary public QWC destination                                     | Public only; no wallet secret is needed         |
| Admission lease     | Epoch-bound RandomX proof and lifecycle binding                    | Public canonical record                         |

The keystore is bound to network, genesis and EPoSE parameters. It is not a wallet and contains no wallet view/spend key. Store it on a protected persistent volume separate from blockchain and wallet data.

On Linux/macOS the file must be regular, non-symlink and mode `0600`. On Windows current builds validate owner/DACL, reject inherited/unrelated access and provide `--epose-v2-repair-keystore-permissions` for a one-start repair of an older file. Back up first, verify unchanged public keys afterward, and remove the flag. Never delete the keystore as a permissions fix.

Endpoint/reward/key changes must use supported lifecycle records and activation rules. The daemon rejects unexpected changes rather than silently redirecting rewards. A backup restores an existing identity; intentionally deleting it creates a new identity that must repeat lifecycle/admission.